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IN RE QUINLAN: DEFINING THE BASIS FOR
TERMINATING LIFE SUPPORT UNDER THE
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
We think that the State's interest contra weakens and the
individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily
invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there
comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome the
State interest.1
With these words, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in In re Quin-
lan,2 unanimously concluded that the machines and medical treat-
ment sustaining Karen Ann Quinlan's life could be withdrawn
without incurring civil or criminal liability. The decision is a judicial
recognition of passive, involuntary euthanasia3 for a patient whose men-
1. In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, -, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
2. Id.
3. The term euthanasia originally carried the connotation of "an easy and happy
death, an ideal and coveted end to a full and pleasant life." I. WILSON, DEATH BY
DECISION 18 (1975). With the passage of time, euthanasia has come to mean an act,
done with the intent to end the life of one who is terminally ill or otherwise severely
restricted to a limited existence, in order to end pain and suffering or for other merciful
motives. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 654 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). The ambiguity caused
by this evolution has created the need to categorize and distinguish the various types
of euthanasia. Thus, for purposes of clarity, distinctions between passive and active
euthanasia, and between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia will be made.
Passive euthanasia involves acts of omission, such as the discontinuance of medical
care in terminal cases, in order to end the useless prolongation of life. Active euthana-
sia, on the other hand, involves the commission of an act with the intent to kill the
patient in order to end great suffering or to terminate a meaningless existence. 0. Rus-
SELL, FtEEDOM TO Dm 19-23 (1975) [hereinafter cited as RUSSELL]. Using a similar
framework to define species of the problem, Professor Fletcher has suggested a further
clarification of the distinction between active and passive euthanasia:
[Whether on all the facts we should be inclined to speak of the activity as
one that causes harm or one merely that permits harm to occur. The usage
of the verbs "causing" and "permitting" corresponds to the distinction between
acts and omissions.
Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WAsH. L. RaV. 999, 1007 (1967). Placed within this
framework, Quinlan endorsed only passive euthanasia since the patient was permitted
to die rather than directly killed. See 70 N.J at -, 355 A.2d at 669-70. However,
the court made it clear that the Quinlan rationale should not be considered as limited
to the passive category. See note 29 infra.
Euthanasia can further be divided into voluntary and involuntary categories, based
on whether the euthanasia decision is made by the person who dies or by others. So
considered, Quinlan recognized involuntary euthanasia. See notes 49 and 55-61 infra
and accompanying text.
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tal and physical health has irrevocably declined to a level of vegetative
existence.
Because of the lax enforcement of the criminal law4 and the fre-
quent occurrence of euthanasia, without independent control and re-
4. An act performed with the intent to terminate the life of another, even though
accompanied by the desire to relieve the extreme suffering of the victim or similar merci-
ful motives, is murder. See State v. Ehlers, 98 N.J.L. 236, 119 A.2d 15 (1922); People
v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920); People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310,
-, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 822, 411 P.2d 911, 918 (1966) (even though one "bears no
ill will toward his victim and believes his act is morally justified . . . he nonetheless
acts with malice if he is able to comprehend that society prohibits his act regardless
of his personal belief.") (dictum); R. PERINs, Cvxsm-TAL LAw 35 (2d ed. 1969).
The fact that the victim may have requested death is also theoretically irrelevant.
Turner v. State, 119 Tenn. 663, -, 108 S.W. 1139, 1141 (1908) ("He who kills another
upon his desire or command is, in the judgment of the law, as much a murderer as
if he had done it of his own hand") (citation omitted). See People v. Roberts, 211
Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920).
Similarly, the low quality of life which a terminally ill patient may be permanently
subjected to is not a mitigating circumstance.
The lives of all are equally under the protection of the law, and under that
protection to their last moment. The life of those to whom life has become
a burden-of those who are hopelessly diseased or fatally wounded-nay, even
the lives of criminals condemned to death, are under the protection of the
law, equally as the lives of those who are in the full tide of life's enjoyment,
and anxious to continue to live.
Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163 (1872).
However, when these onerous rules of law are applied to the sympathetic facts in-
volved in cases of euthanasia, compassion generally triumphs and the rules are twisted
to reach the "right" result.
[A]lIthough conceptually the law does not treat mercy killing differently from
other cases involving the taking of human life, in practice an exception does
exist. Prosecutors, judges and juries do approach a mercy killing case differ-
ently. Public opinion does not reflect the same revulsion against an act of
mercy killing that it does toward other instances of murder. . . . Although
there may be opposition to mercy killing in principle, there is sympathy for
the mercy killer.
Kunter, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539,
542 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Kunter]. For instance, it took a jury only forty min-
utes to find Robert Waskin not guilty, by reason of insanity, of the murder of his termi-
nally ill mother. She had been shot in order to end the great pain that she was suffer-
ing. Sanders, Euthanasia: None Dare Call It Murder, 60 J. C~uM. L.C. & P.S. 351
(1969). See, e.g., People v. Kirby, 2 Parker Crim. R. 28 (N.Y. 1823) (defendant's
sentence for the murder of his children in order to allow them to enjoy the spiritual
world of God without further subjection to the miseries of human existence commuted
by the governor); Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947) (jury's plea
for "utmost clemency" for the defendant who had murdered his grossly handicapped
son was granted by the trial judge by placing the father on probation); Commonwealth
v. Noxon, 319 Mass. 495, 66 N.E.2d 814 (1946), discussed in Sanders, supra at 356
(sentence of death for the electrocution of defendant's mongoloid baby commuted to
life, then reduced to six years with parole granted after the defendant served about four
years in prison); Note, Voluntary Euthanasia: A Proposed Remedy, 39 ALB. L. REv.
826, 832 (1975) (defendant doctor acquitted of a murder allegedly accomplished by
the injection of poison into a pain-riddled cancer patient) (defendant found not guilty,
by reason of insanity, of the murder of his brother who was paralyzed as the result
of a motorcycle accident). See generally G. WiLLIAms, Tia SANCTIY OF Ln im
THn CnMNAL LAw (1957) [hereinafter cited as Wn.LiAms]; RUSSELL, supra note 3.
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view," there exists a need for reform in the law concerning the treat-
ment and care of the dying.' Whether the New Jersey court has
established a sound foundation for narrowing the gap between what
has been referred to as the "Law On The Books" and the "Law In
Action '7 is the subject of this note.
THE QUINLAN DECISION
For reasons that remain unclear, twenty-two year old Karen Ann
Quinlan stopped breathing for at least two fifteen-minute periods."
Arriving at a New Jersey hospital in an unconscious state, Ms. Quinlan
was placed on a respirator in an effort to maintain her vital systems.9
5. Note, Voluntary Euthanasia: A Proposed Remedy, 39 ALB. L. Rnv. at 827-
28. See RUSSELL, supra note 3, at 155; note 4 supra. In RUSSELL, supra note 3, at
237-38, two physicians reported they knew that forty-three infants had been allowed
to die in their hospital during a year and a half period. The decisions to allow the
recently born infants to die were made with the consent of their parents. The infants
were, the doctors concluded, deformed to such an extent that they lacked any possibility
of enjoying "meaningful humanhood." In the Quinlan trial, doctors also testified about
similar instances in which patients were allowed to die. 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at
657. On this aspect the court observed:
We glean from the record here that physicians distinguish between curing
the ill and comforting and easing the dying ... and that they have some-
times refused to treat the hopeless and dying as if they were curable. In this
sense. . . many of them have refused to inflict an undesired prolongation of
the process of dying on a patient in irreversible condition when it is clear
that such "therapy" offers neither human nor humane benefit.
Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 667.
6. Despite the contradictory situation presented by the laws, on the one hand, and
the beliefs and practices of society regarding euthanasia, on the other, at least one writer
is satisfied with the present state of affairs. As he has observed:
The Law On The Books condemns all mercy-killings. That this has a
substantial deterrent effect, even its harshest critics admit. Of course, it does
not stamp out all mercy-killings, just as murder and rape provisions do not
stamp out all murder and rape, but presumably it does impose a substantially
greater responsibility on physicians and relatives in a euthanasia situation and
turns them away from significantly more doubtful cases than would othervise
be the practice under any proposed euthanasia legislation to date. When a
mercy-killing occurs, however, The Law In Action is as malleable as The Law
On The Books is uncompromising. The high incidence of failures to indict,
acquittals, suspended sentences and reprieves lends considerable support to the
view that-
If the circumstances are so compelling that the defendant ought to violate
the law, then they are compelling enough for the jury to violate their
oaths. The law does well to declare these homicides unlawful. It does
equally well to put no more than the sanction of an oath in the way
of acquittal.
Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed Mercy-Killing Legislation, 42
MINN. L. Rlv. 969, 971 (1958), reprinted in EuTHANASIA AND THE RirHT TO Din 85
(E. Downing ed. 1969) (footnotes omitted) (quoting C. CuRTIs, IT's YouR LAw 95
(1954)) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar].
7. Id.
8. 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 653-54.
9. The medical experts agreed that the respirator was necessary for the patient's
survival, even though they were unsure how long she might live without the machine's
[Vol. 12:150
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The lack of oxygen resulting from the interruptions of her breathing
apparently caused severe brain damage10 which reduced her existence
to a "vegetative state."' '"
Aware that the chances of restoring Ms. Quinlan to a conscious
and meaningful existence were virtually non-existent,' 2 Mr. Quinlan
sought to have his daughter's life-support system removed, thereby
allowing her to die.' 3 When Ms. Quinlan's physician refused the
request to terminate on the grounds that the proposed action would be
contrary to medical practice and ethics,' 4 Mr. Quinlan requested judicial
relief. He petitioned to be appointed guardian of his daughter's per-
son with a special power to discontinue life-support measures. 15  The
lower court, while sympathizing with the plight of the patient and her
family, denied relief, reasoning that the decision to remove the life-
support system was a medical, not legal, matter.' 6
On appeal the New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed, placing itself
in a position to directly face the euthanasia issue:
Such notions as to the distribution of responsibility, here-
tofore generally entertained, should neither impede this Court
in deciding matters clearly justiciable nor preclude a re-
examination by the Court as to underlying human values and
rights. Determinations as to these must, in the ultimate, be
assistance. They also agreed that removal of the respirator would, in any event, in-
crease the risk of brain damage. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 655.
10. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 654.
11. Id. "Dr. Fred Plum, one of [the] expert witnesses, (said this term described]
• a 'subject who remains with the capacity to maintain the vegetative parts of neu-
rological function but who. . . no longer has any cognitive function."' Id.
12. Id. at -- 355 A.2d at 655.
13. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 656-57.
14. Id. Frequently such refusals are based on the Hippocratic Oath. RussELL, su-
pra note 3, at 220-22; Gillon, Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia: Historical Perspective,
in EuTHANAsrA AN Tim RIGHT To DEE 189-90 (E. Downing ed. 1969).
15. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 651. The parties agreed that Ms. Quinlan was incompe-
tent and that the appointment of a guardian was necessary. 70 NJ. at -, 355 A.2d
at 653. The superior court accepted Mr. Quinlan as guardian of his daughter's prop-
erty, but felt it was more appropriate to name another as guardian of her person. 137
N.J. Super. at -, 348 A.2d at 824. The supreme court reversed the lower court on
this point and allowed the father to serve as both guardian of the person and property.
70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 670-71.
16. 137 N.J. Super. at -, 348 A.2d at 819. In the alternative, the court stated
that if the decision were a legal one, relief would still be denied. It reasoned:
It is also noted the concept of the court's power over a person suffering
under a disability is to protect and aid . . . [his] best interests. . . . Here
the authorization sought, if granted, would result in Karen's death. . . . This
is not protection. It is not something in her best interests, in a temporal sense,
and it is in a temporal sense that I must operate whether I believe in life
after death or not. The single most important temporal quality Karen Ann
Quinlan has is life.
Id. at -, 348 A.2d at 819-20 (emphasis in original).
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responsive not only to the concepts of medicine but also to
the common moral judgment of the community at large. In
the latter respect the Court has a nondelegable judicial re-
sponsibility. 17
Granting declaratory relief, the court held, on the authority of Roe v.
Wade, 8 that the constitutional right 'of privacy protected a decision
to terminate medical care in certain instances. 10
In analyzing the problem the court considered whether infringe-
ment of Ms. Quinlan's fundamental right to control what happened
to her body20 was justified by the state's interest in the "preservation
and sanctity of human life and . . . the right of the physician to ad-
minister medical treatment according to his best judgment."'" In
light of the dismal prognosis22 and the high degree of bodily invasion
involved,23 the court found that Ms. Quinlan's right to control her
own body prevailed.24 Apparently the state's interest would have
been sufficient to justify the denial of Mr. Quinlan's request if the
patient could have been returned to sapient life.28
A second problem which faced the court was the inability of the
patient to exercise her right to privacy by making a decision concerning
her future medical care.2 6 The court's answer was to allow the
17. 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 665.
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. 70 NJ. at -, 355 A.2d at 663. It should be noted that the supreme court
agreed with the lower court in refusing to order the termination of the life-support sys-
tem and care. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 660.
20. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
21. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 663.
22. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 664.
23. This invasion included, "24 hour intensive nursing care, antibiotics, the as-
sistance of a respirator, a catheter and feeding tube." Id.
24. Id.
25. See id. at -, 355 A.2d at 663. However, this conclusion is not free from doubt
since the court added confusion to the case by declaring that the relief granted was
"not intended to imply that the principles enunciated in this case might not be applica-
ble in divers other types of terminal medical situations . . . not necessarily involving
the hopeless loss of cognitive or sapient life." Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 671 n.10. Yet
"the focal point of decision should be the prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of
return to cognitive and sapient life, as distinguished from the forced continuance of
that biological existence to which Karen seems to be doomed." Id. at -, 355 A.2d
at 669.26. Id. There was evidence of statements allegedly made by the patient expressing
a desire not to be kept alive through heroic medical measures if she ever became
terminally ill. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 653; 137 N.J. Super. at -, 348 A.2d at 814.
The supreme court agreed, in substance, with the lower court that these statements were
so remote and impersonal that they lacked sufficient weight to be used as a basis for
inferring the patient's choice. 70 NJ. at -, 355 A.2d at 653, 664. See notes 26
supra, and 67-75 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 12:150
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guardian and the family of the patient to make the decision for Ms.
Quinlan.27 However, the court placed a procedural limitation on this
delegation of authority. The power could be exercised only if the
attending physicians and the hospital's "Ethics Committee" 28 or simi-
lar body concluded that there was little hope of recovery.2 9
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
While the privacy rationale could justify the termination of medi-
cal care in a Quinlan situation, it does not support the Quinlan court's
delegation of the patient's right to decide to the guardian and family.
In order to analyze the court's approach, three hypothetical situations
will be presented. The time of the decision to discontinue medical
treatment, or the person making the decision, will be varied in each
situation in order to determine the extent to which the right of privacy
justifies the discontinuance of treatment.
Situation 1
Patient A, a single competent adult, is informed by his physician
that he has a terminal illness and is hospitalized. He is told that with
the use of drugs and therapy his life can be extended one or two years.
Without the suggested course of care, A can expect to live about three
months. A refuses to submit to treatment, arguing that involuntary
treatment would violate his right to privacy.
27. 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 664. It was not clear whether the power to decide
belonged solely to the guardian or was shared by the guardian and the patient's family.
At one point the court vested the power solely in the guardian. Id. Later the court
spoke as if both the guardian and the family could exercise the decision making power.
Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 671. One source of confusion is that the guardian appointed
by the supreme court was also the father of the patient. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 670-
71.
28. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 671. Concerning the requirement, the court observed:
The most appealing factor in the technique ... seems to us to be the
diffusion of professional responsibility for decision, comparable in a way to
the value of multi-judge courts in finally resolving on appeal difficult questions
of law. Moreover, such a system would be protective to the hospital as well
as the doctor in screening out, so to speak, a case which might be contami-
nated by less than worthy motivations of family or physician. In the real
world and in relationship to the momentous decision contemplated, the value
of additional views and diverse knowledge is apparent.
Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 669.
29. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 671. The court stated that the resulting death would
not be a homicide but rather one due to natural causes. Alternatively, if the death
was to be considered a homicide, the court suggested, it would be protected by the right
of privacy and therefore not a violation of the law. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 669-70.
The court noted "[tihere is a real and in this case determinative distinction between
the unlawful taking of life of another and the ending of artificial life-support systems
as a matter of self-determination." Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 670.
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Whether the patient's decision is protected by the right of privacy
from any attempt to compel him to submit to treatment depends, in
part, on whether his right to refuse medical treatment "can be deemed
'fundamental' or 'implicit' in the concept of ordered liberty,"30 since
these are the only types of interests that come within this constitutional
protection."1 While the Supreme Court has never held that the right
to refuse medical treatment is fundamental, it has found that the pro-
tection of privacy extends to an individual's decisions in areas affecting
the person's bodily integrity and personal autonomy. For example,
decisions regarding the extraction of evidence from the stomach of a
drug suspect,82 the use of contraceptives 8 and abortion84 have been
found to be within the right of privacy. Because A's decision not to
submit to further medical care is no less a question of bodily integrity
and control, no less a question of "intimacy and importance,"85i and
no less a question "fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," it is therefore no less worthy of constitutional protection than
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
31. Id. This requirement suggests that a cautious case by case approach to the
right of privacy and its development is being employed by the Supreme Court. Com-
ment, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Does Privacy Have a Principle?]. Thus the definitive answer on
the patient's right to discontinue medical care, will have to await a Supreme Court deci-
sion. At the present time, however, the Court has refused to review a case involving
this issue. Delgado, Euthanasia Reconsidered-The Choice of Death as an Aspect of
the Right of Privacy, 17 Am. L. REv. 474, 475 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Delgado].
The parties in Quinlan have agreed not to seek review of the decision by the Court.
Tulsa World, April 7, 1976, at 8a, col. 6. But see Garger v. New Jersey, 45 U.S.L.W.
3204 (1976) (petitioning Supreme Court for review of Quinlan).
32. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). While the Court did not rest the
case expressly on the right of privacy, its use of the "fundamental or implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" language, id. at 169, and its shock at the illegal intrusion
into the privacy of the suspect, id. at 172, strongly suggests the applicability of 'that
doctrine. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
33. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
34. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). The
identification of these areas does not exhaust the scope of privacy's protection. The
intent is to examine those areas protected by privacy which will offer the best analogy
to the situation involved in Quinlan. Decisions in related areas which do not speak
in terms of privacy, but protect private decisions from governmental intrusion under
similar rationales include: Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (educating chil-
dren); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage partners); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (raising and
educating children); Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (raising and educating
children). See 410 U.S. at 152-53; Delgado, supra note 31.
35. Delgado, supra note 31, at 477. "Indeed, the decision to die is even more inti-
mate than the decision to abort since no potentially independent entity is destroyed."
Id. at 478 (footnote omitted).
7
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these previously recognized areas. 6
The conclusion that the right to refuse medical treatment is funda-
mental is further supported by the protection given bodily autonomy
by lower courts through the doctrine of informed consent. This doc-
trine, which conditions medical treatment on a patient's understanding
and agreement, 3" is premised on the notion that "[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body .. .. s38 While the doctrine seems to be used
primarily in negligence actions involving a doctor's duty of care,3 9 it
has also been employed to analyze situations in which a patient refuses
medical treatment. Even though in the majority of such cases treat-
ment is ordered in spite of the patient's objections,40 treatment has
been withheld upon the patients demand in at least three cases.4 '
These cases, rather than suggesting that decisions to refuse medical
treatment are not fundamentally protected, indicate the state interests
which can justify infringing such protection. Of prime importance
in each case was the high degree of probability that, with the use of
the objected-to course of treatment, the patient would be restored to a
meaningful and cognitive existence.4" Another factor was the presence
36. Delgado, supra note 31, at 476; Moore, The Case for Voluntary Euthanasia,
42 U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 327, 330 (1974); Survey, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Consti-
tutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 NoTaE DAMm LAW. 1203, 1244 (1973).
37. "A two-fold duty is imposed: The physician must disclose certain information
about collateral risks, and he must not proceed without consent to the risks which were,
or should have been, disclosed." Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy,
64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628, 630 (1970).
38. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See Natanson
v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960).
39. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Nishi v. Hart-
well, 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350
P.2d 1093, rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Wilkinson v. Vesey,
295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967); ZeBarth v.
Swedish Hosp., 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis.
2d 596, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973). See note 37 supra.
40. Application of Pres. & Dirs. of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752
(D. Conn. 1965); John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d
670 (1971); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 NJ. Super. 498,
320 A.2d 518 (1974); Application of Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 73 Misc.
2d 395, 342 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Med.
Ctr., 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc.
2d 622, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
41. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972); Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill.
2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d
705 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
42. Application of Pres. & Dirs. of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
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of minor children who, along with the community, would be adversely
affected by the unnecessary death of their parent.43 Finally, theneed fr • • 44
need for quick action influenced the decisions. As one court observed:
There was no time for research and reflection. Death could
have mooted the cause in a matter of minutes, if action were
not taken to preserve the status quo. To refuse to act, only
to find later that the law required action, was a risk I was
unwilling to accept. I determined to act on the side of life.45
Because in the first hypothetical A's interest in personal autonomy
is so significant, the right of privacy encompasses his decision to refuse
further medical treatment. As indicated by Roe,4" Quinlan47 and the
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752
(D. Conn. 1965); John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d
670 (1971); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974);
Application of Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 73 Misc. 2d 395, 342 N.Y.S.2d
356 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
43. In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964), a guardian was appointed for an unborn, quick child,
whose mother had given advanced warning of her refusal to consent to blood transfu-
sions. Without the transfusions, which the doctors anticipated would be vital to a suc-
cessful birth, the risks to both mother and child would have been greatly increased.
42 NJ. at -, 201 A.2d at 537-38. In Application of Pres. & Dirs. of Georgetown
College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), the court
noted:
The patient, 25 years old, was the mother of a seven-month-old child. The
state, as parenr patriae, will not allow a parent to abandon a child, and so
it should not allow this most ultimate of voluntary abandonments. The patient
had a responsibility to the community to care for her infant. Thus the people
had an interest in preserving the life of this mother.
331 F.2d at 1008. United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965) involved
a patient who was the father of four children. 239 F. Supp. at 753. In Powell v.
Columbian Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1965),
the patient was the mother of six children. The need to seek judicial authorization
resulted from post-operational complications following the caesarian delivery of her sixth
child. 49 Misc. 2d at -, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
44. See cases cited at notes 41 and 43-44 supra.
45. Application of Pres. & Dirs. of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1009-
10, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). In cases where courts refused to authorize the
medical procedures necessary to save the life involved, one or more of the factors previ-
ously discussed, notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text, were missing. For instance,
in In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972), the court upheld a lower court
order which refused to authorize medical care. The need for swift judicial action had
passed since the patient had recovered by the time the case came before the higher
court. 294 A.2d at 376 n.6. Also, the court emphasized the fact that the surviving
parent and other family members were financially prepared to care for the children
of the patient. Id. at 374. In Estate of Brooks, 32 IMI. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965),
another appellate court reversed a lower court order of medical treatment. There the
patient had told her doctor for two years that her religious beliefs precluded the use
of blood transfusions and had received assurances, apparently by her doctor, that none
would be attempted. 32 Il. 2d at -, 205 N.E.2d at 436-37. Also, the court noted
the absence of minor children of the patient. Id. at -, 205 N.E.2d at 442.
46. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
47. 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 663.
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informed consent cases, 4s the weight of the state's interest in the preser-
vation of human life is lessened as the quality of the patient's life di-
minishes.49 Thus the fact that A's life expectancy is extremely short
48. See notes 42-45 supra.
49. In Quinlan, the court considered the lack of probability of restoration of the
patient to a cognitive life very important. 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 663. The court
stated:
The plaintiff answers that Karen's present treatment serves only a maintenance
function; that the respirator cannot cure or improve her condition but at best
can only prolong her inevitable slow deterioration and death; and that the in-
terests of the patient, as seen by her surrogate, the guardian, must be evalu-
ated by the court as predominant, even in the face of an opinion contra by
the present attending physicians. Plaintiff s distinction is significant.
Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 663-64. In Roe, the Court noted:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by deny-
ing this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diag-
nosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional
offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychologi-
cal harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by
child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases,
as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her respon-
sible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.
410 U.S. at 153.
The wedge principle has been raised as an objection to the idea that the predicted
quality of an individual's life is a valid consideration in euthanasia decisions. Implicit
in the rationale of cases such as Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872) which
have held that quality of a victim's life is not a mitigating factor in murder cases, the
wedge argument is "that an act which, if raised to a general line of conduct would
injure humanity, is wrong even in an individual case." WiLLTAMs, supra note 4, at
315. Under this argument, allowing mercy-killing in an appealing case (such as A's)
is wrong because it is the thin edge of a precedential wedge which will widen the law's
exceptions to murder, permitting homicide in less justifiable circumstances. Thus, per-
mitting the withdrawal of life-support measures in hopeless cases is seen as inevitably
leading to the involuntary termination of groups such as the aged, the physically handi-
capped, the mentally ill and the criminally insane. See Kamisar, supra note 7, at 1031.
The Nazi program of genocide which followed a euthanasia program for the aged has
been cited as an example of the operation of the wedge. Id. at 1031-33.
The wedge objection to euthanasia under a privacy rationale is unpersuasive for
three reasons. First, the argument's assumption that permitting less offensive practices
will invariably lead to more shocking ones, because it is impossible to draw a satisfactory
ethical line between the two extremes, is not borne out in the euthanasia situation. The
distinction between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia very clearly separates some
justified cases from the unjustified cases of euthanasia. As long as euthanasia is limited
to voluntary situations and the patient's choice remains meaningful, social expediency
can never justify the murder of social undesirables. Cf. RUSSELL, supra note 3, at 90-93.
Conversely, to the extent that Quinlan permitted involuntary euthanasia, it is vulnerable
to the wedge objection. See notes 55-61 infra and accompanying text.
Secondly, since euthanasia is already widely practiced, see notes 4 and 5 supra,
it is likely that, rather than leading to more horrible practices, the recognition of volun-
tary euthanasia would tend to restrict the practice of unauthorized, involuntary euthana-
sia.
Finally, the persuasiveness of the wedge argument is weakened because it could
be advanced against almost any change in the social order.
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weakens the importance of the state's interest.50 A further weakening
of that interest is compelled if A's illness produces great pain and suf-
fering. When this is coupled with other adverse consequences of forc-
ing him to endure the illness as long as medically possible, 1 it is clear
that the state's interest in preserving life is insufficiently compelling to
justify infringing his right of privacy. Thus, the right of privacy would
protect A's decision to refuse medical treatment.
Situation 2
B, a single adult, is involved in a car accident in which he is
rendered unconscious. He is taken to a hospital where, because of
his condition, a maze of life-support machines is connected to his body
in order to maintain his vital systems. Afterwards it is learned that B
has suffered severe brain damage and is doomed to a comatose exist-
ence. B's father, after being informed of his son's status, seeks the
disconnection of the life-support system, claiming that his son's right
of privacy allows him, in behalf of B, to decide whether use of the
life-support system should be continued.
The initial treatment of B is justified by a well-established excep-
tion to the rule of informed consent. 52  This exception is applied in
situations where the patient's condition demands immediate medical
attention, but the patient is unable to communicate his consent to such
treatment. In this type of emergency, consent is sometimes said to be
implied, allowing treatment to begin in the absence of actual consent. 51
After emergency treatment for B begins, there are no socially rational
options available to the medical personnel, in light of the state's policy of
[Tihis type of reasoning could be used to condemn any act whatever, because
there is no human conduct from which evil cannot be imagined to follow if
it is persisted in when some of the circumstances are changed. All moral
questions involve the drawing of a line, but the "wedge principle" would make
it impossible to draw a line, because the line would have to be pushed farther
and farther back until all action became vetoed.
WILrA Ms, supra note 4, at 315.
50. See notes 42-49 supra and accompanying text.
51. See note 49 supra.
52. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Mohr
v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, -, 104 N.W. 12, 15 (1905); King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62,
64, 204 P. 270, 272 (1922); Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 577-78, 137 P. 96, 98
(1913).
53. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, -, 104 N.W. 12, 15 (1905); Rolater v. Strain,
39 Okla. 572, 577-78, 137 P. 96, 98 (1913). Other cases recognize this particular ex-
ception without discussing whether the consent should be implied. See, e.g., Canterbury
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972); King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 64,
204 P. 270,272 (1922).
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preserving life, but to administer all possible care. 4 Prior to B's father's
request, no privacy issue is involved since a decision to discontinue
life-support has not been made by, or on behalf of, the patient. Even
after B's father decides to discontinue life-support, the right of privacy
is not a valid justification for the termination of medical care at the
request of B's father.
The privacy cases decided by the Supreme Court have established
the individual's qualified right of control over his body in matters of
personal importance. 5 Roe, for example, limited the power of the
state to foreclose a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. 6
Authorizing the termination of treatment in B's case on the decision
of another, as the court did in Quinlan, is different. Instead of pro-
moting personal control over one's body, such authorization would
allow others to intrude and make a decision for the patient.51 This
judicially authorized interference with a protected decision appears
to be inconsistent with the rationale of the right of privacy. This in-
consistency is suggested by the recent case of Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth.58
In Danforth, the Supreme Court held invalid statutes which re-
quired the consent of husbands and parents to the decisions of their
wives and children, respectively, to have nonemergency abortions dur-
ing the first term of their pregnancy. The Court reasoned that "since
the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage
* . .[it] cannot delegate authority to any particular person . . . to
prevent abortion during that same period."'5 9 Clearly, under the ra-
tionale of Danforth, the right of privacy should not justify the termina-
tion of B's treatment by his father.60
Similarly, to the extent that Quinlan was decided under such a
theory, it is invalid. Cloaking a determination based on social ex-
54. See 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 657.
55. See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text.
56. 410 U.S. at 162-64.
57. See 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 671.
58. 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
59. Id. at 2841. The involvement of doctors in the decision making process
was not considered an unconstitutional intrusion into the patient's privacy because their
function is "to advise the patient of the state of his closest physical, mental, and social
associate-his own body." Delgado, supra note 31, at 478 (footnotes omitted).
60. Attempts by family members to prevent the rendition of medical treatment to
a patient, unable to communicate, were defeated in John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v.
Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1970); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J.
Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974); and Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc. 2d 622, 254 N.Y.S.2d
666 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
1976]
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pediency under a privacy rationale in order to de-emphasize the
difficult legal and moral0 ' issues involved, Quinlan suggested that its
holding reflected the desires of the patient when, in fact, it effected
the wishes of others. While social expediency may have been a valid
ground for the decision, the court should have dealt with the issue
and its attendant problems straightforwardly. Even so, the Quinlan
court could have reached the same result under a rationale which re-
spected the patient's privacy. This approach is presented by the last
hypothetical.
Situation 3
The facts are the same as in situation 2. Additionally, however, B
has expressed a desire to several members of his family and friends,
on different occasions, never to have his life prolonged in the ab-
sence of a reasonable possibility of recovery. B's father seeks judi-
cial authorization to discontinue his son's life-support system on the
basis that B has chosen to have medical care terminated in this situation.
Many times, as in this hypothetical, the full extent of the patient's
injuries may not be known when treatment is initiated. When it is
realized that the patient has no reasonable hope of regaining conscious-
ness, it is too late for him to demand the withdrawal of the care main-
taining his twilight existence.2 The issue raised is whether a prior
decision, indicating the patient's refusal to consent to treatment in a
certain situation, should receive the protection of privacy by requiring
the implementation of that decision upon the occurrence of the speci-
fied contingencies.
It has been observed that the right of privacy has been held to
protect matters involving personal control and bodily integrity.0 3 How-
ever, the cases providing such protection did not involve decisions
intended to take effect only upon the occurrence of certain future
events.6 4  Yet, the fact that the effect of a decision is subject to a
specific occurrence should not diminish its importance as an aspect
of individual liberty. The time of a decision is of least significance; of
primary importance is the control over one's body in "intimate and
momentous matters. '65 If B's past decision is a matter within the pro-
61. See note 49 supra.
62. See generally Tim MoMENT OF DEATH (A. Winter ed. 1969).
63. See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
64. The same is true of those cases in which medical treatment was not ordered
by the respective courts. See note 41 supra.
65. Delgado, supra note 31, at 477.
[Vol. 12:150
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tection of privacy, the only difference between this situation and the
first hypothetical is B's inability to reiterate his decision. In such case,
all that blocks the withdrawal of the life-support system are the prob-
lems presented by the use of B's prior oral statements as evidence
of his decision not to submit to medical treatment in the circumstances
that exist.
In Quinlan, Ms. Quinlan's prior oral statements made before her
accident, while she was competent,6 were brought to the attention of
both courts, as evidence of the patienfs choice regarding the continua-
tion of the medical care that she was receiving. 67  The essence of these
statements was Ms. Quinlan's desire to avoid the useless prolongation
of her life by "extraordinary means."68  While these prior statements
were, no doubt, hearsay,69 they could have been admitted under the
state of mind exception to the rule.70 However, both courts ignored the
possibility, labeling the statements too remote and impersonal to have
probative value.71
Relief would be unavailable for B if the approach used in Quinlan
becomes the general course of treatment of these kinds of statements.
Instead of a conclusory analysis of the statements, a better approach
would be to explore the reasons behind the rejection of the evidence.
66. She had made the statements in response to the situations of relatives and
friends, suffering from terminal illnesses, whose lives had been prolonged through heroic
measures. Id. at--, 355 A.2d at 653; 137 N.J. Super. at--, 348 A.2d at 814.
67. 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 653; 137 N.J. Super. at -, 348 A.2d at 814. The
New Jersey Supreme Court apparently dealt with the statements as if they were offered
for the purpose of inferring a present decision. See 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 664.
The evidentiary problem is the same whether the statements are offered as a basis to
infer a present or past decision.
68. Id. "[O]ne would have to think that the use of the same respirator or like
support could be considered 'ordinary' in the context of the possibly curable patient
but 'extraordinary' in the context of the forced sustaining by cardio-respiratory proc-
esses of an irreversibly doomed patient." 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 668.
69. 70 NJ. at -, 355 A.2d at 653. See McCoNdIcK's HANDBOOK OF Tm LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 246 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoP.m cu].
70. See McCo~annc, supra note 69, §§ 294-95.
[I]t was made clear that declarations of mental state are generally admissible
to prove the declarant's state of mind when that state of mind is at issue.
But the probative value of a state of mind obviously goes beyond the state
of mind itself, as indicated by general acceptance of the proposition that evi-
dence of design or intent is relevant and admissible to show conduct.
Id. § 295 at 697.
71. 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 653. The lower court reasoned:
The conversations with her mother and friends were theoretical ones. She
was not personally involved. They were not made under the solemn and sober-
ing fact that death is a distinct choice. . . . Karen Quinlan, while she was
in complete control of her mental faculties to reason out the staggering magni-
tude of the decision not to be "kept alive," did not make a decision.
137 N.J. Super. at -, 348 A.2d at 819 (citation omitted).
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Was one of the reasons for the court's apprehension the gap between
the time the statements were made and the occurrence of the trag-
edy? 72  Was the court concerned with the possibility of inaccuracies
and fabrications by the witnesses in reciting the oral statements at a
later time?73 Could the possibility that the statements were made with-
out serious thought or in a matter-of-fact manner have troubled the
court?74 Did the gravity of the case and its consequences make the
court reluctant to proceed on the sometimes suspect nature of hear-
say?75
The opportunity to examine the statements and the circumstances
in which they were made should have been taken by the court. A
withdrawal of life-support care based on the decision of the unconscious
patient, whether considered to be a past or present one, as inferred
from carefully considered prior oral statements, would have placed the
court's privacy rationale on a sounder basis than did its'delegation of
the patient's choice to others. 76 Comprehensive treatment of the issues
involved in the use of these hearsay statements, even if leading to a
rejection of the statements, would have at least emphasized the need
for a legislative solution. One such solution that has been offered is
the living will, a version of which has been adopted by one state legis-
lature.77
The living will, as its name suggests, is a variation of its testa-
mentary namesake. Instead of concerning itself with the recordation
of the testator's wishes concerning the disposition of property, it is
exclusively concerned with the preservation of the "testator's" decisions
concerning possible future medical care. By recognizing a living will,
a state, in the same way it limits how one can deal with his property,
would make requirements of form which would have to be met before
a past decision concerning the termination of life-support would be given
effect, but when met would require the recognition of such decisions.7"
72. See McCoRMIcx, supra note 69, § 294, at 695-96.
73. Id. at § 245.
74. See note 70 supra.
75. See McCoRMcK, supra note 69, at § 245.
76. See notes 55-61 supra and accompanying text.
77. Natural Death Act, ch. 1439, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6273 (West) (to be codified
as CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195).
78. The document would be notarized and attested to by at least two witnesses
who would affirm that the maker was of sound mind and acted of his own
free will. The individual could carry the document on his person at all times,
while his wife, his personal physician, a lawyer or confidant would have the
original copy.
Each individual case would be referred to a hospital committee, board
or a committee of physicians. . . . The committee or board would consider
[Vol. 12:150
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Thus, the living will is based on privacy, "the principle . . . of self-
determination: [In]on-interference with the liberty of action." '79
The obvious advantage of the document is that it allows the
maker an opportunity for competent and serious thought concerning
his desires in a situation which may deprive him of those abilities. It
also offers "formal" evidences° to both medical and legal authorities
the circumstances under which the document was made in determining the pa-
tient's intent and also make a determination as to whether the condition of
the patient has indeed reached the point where he would no longer want any
treatment.
The individual could at any time, before reaching the comatose state, re-
voke the document. Personal possession of the document would create a
strong presumption that he regards it as still binding. Statements and actions
subsequent to the writing of the document may indicate a contrary intent. If
the physicians find that some doubt exists as to the patient's intent, they would
give treatment pending the resolution of the matter ...
A living will could only be made by a person who is capable of giving
his consent to treatment. . . . A guardian should not be permitted to make
such a declaration on behalf of his ward nor a parent on behalf of his child.
Kunter, supra note 4, at 551-52 (emphasis in original). The California Act also pro-
vides for the execution of a written document, witnessed by two disinterested people
who affirm that the maker is of sound mind. Natural Death Act, ch. 1439, § 7188,
1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6275-76 (West). It similarly requires a determination by at least
two physicians that the patient is within the reach of the Act. Id. § 7187(e), at 6275.
Revocation can be made at any time, regardless of the competency of the patient at
that time. Id. § 7189, at 6276. Finally, only a competent adult can execute the docu-
ment. Id. § 7188, at 6275-76.
It is unlikely that the refusal to give effect to a patient's prior decision unless such
formal requirements were met would unreasonably infringe the patient's right of privacy.
See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2839-40 (1976).
79. Kunter, The Living Will, Coping with the Historical Event of Death, 27
BAYLOR L. REv. 39, 41 (1975).
80. One format of the living will reads:
TO MY FAMILY, PHYSICIAN, MY CLERGYMAN, MY LAWYER-
If the time comes when I can no longer take part in decisions for my own
future, let this statement stand as the testment of my wishes:
If there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery from physical or, mental
disability, I, request that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive
by artificial means or heroic measures. Death is as much a reality as birth,
growth, maturity and old age-it is the one certainty. I do not fear death
as much as I fear the indignity of deterioration, dependence and hopeless pain.
I ask that drugs be mercifully administered to me for terminal suffering even
if they hasten the moment of death. This request is made after careful consid-
eration. Although this document is not legally binding, you who care for me
will, I hope, feel morally bound to follow its mandate. I recognize that it
places a heavy burden of responsibility upon you, and it is with the intention





RUSSELL, supra note 3, at 296-97 (taken from Euthanasia Educational Council). The
California document is not as broad as Kunter's suggested living will. While the living
will can be implemented when there is a lack of a reasonable possibility of recovery,
note 78 supra, the California "Directive to Physicians" can take effect only when "death
is imminent" and the use of life-support machines and care "serve only to postpone
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that the maker had contemplated the situation and its consequences
and had made a definite choice concerning what should be done."1
It is therefore a device that enables the potential patient to record and
exercise a decision not to accept further medical treatment when it has
been determined that he has virtually no hope of recovery. As such,
it avoids both the useless prolongation of a meaningless existence and
the evidentiary problems that troubled the Quinlan court, and thus per-
mits euthanasia soundly based on the constitutional right of privacy."2
CONCLUSION
Society now recognizes that men and women have
responsibility for intelligent planning of birth. Has not the
time come to recognize also their responsibility for intelligent
planning of death?88
Quinlan is a faltering step toward the realization of the suggested
goal. It is ostensibly a recognition that the right of privacy protects
a patient's decision to have a life-support system discontinued in order
that the natural process of death may accomplish its mission. By
accepting that the state's interest weakens when the life it seeks to
protect has been permanently reduced to a vegetative level, Quinlan is,
more significantly, a legal realization that not only the fact of life but
the quality of life is a very important aspect of human existence.
the moment of death of the patient." Natural Death Act, ch. 1439, § 7187-7188, 1976
Cal. Legis. Serv. 6274-76 (West). Thus, the effect and scope of the Act would appear
to be quite restrictive. This narrowness is emphasized by the section which provides:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve mercy
killing, or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end life other than
to permit the natural process of dying as provided in this chapter." Id. § 7195, at
6278.
81. It has been observed that "[c]ompliance with the total combination of require-
ments for the execution of formal attested wills has a marked ritual value, since the
general ceremonial precludes the possibility that the testator was acting in a casual or
haphazard fashion." Gulliver & Tillson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE
LJ. 1, 5 (1941) (footnote omitted). Since the consequences of the living will involve
the life of the maker, public policy may require that the informal, holographic type
of will should not be recognized as a valid form of the living will, thereby insuring
the safeguards, which formality brings, in all cases. With these requirements, the time
factor between the execution of the document and the occurrence of the operative events
should not concern the court, see text accompanying note 72 supra, since the idea
is to provide the maker an opportunity to decide before a tragedy occurs. See Kunter,
supra note 4, at 550-51. California imposes a time gap of at least 14 days between
the execution of the document and the effectuation of its directive. Natural Death
Act, ch. 1439, § 7191(b), 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6277 (West).
82. See notes 55-75 supra and accompanying text.
83. RussELL, supra note 3, at 219.
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However, Quinlan stumbles in its reasoning by authorizing third
parties to exercise the decision of the patient. The patient's right of
privacy provides a zone of protection for the exercise of choice by the
patient. The judicially sanctioned entrance of third parties into this
zone is not justified by the privacy rationale. The result is indeed un-
fortunate, since the prior oral statements of the patient might have pro-
vided a sufficient basis for finding that a decision had been made by
Ms. Quinlan. Judicial recognition of this decision would have provided
a sounder foundation for terminating Ms. Quinlan's life-support system
under the right of privacy.
William F. Smith
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